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Abstract
We focus on the problem of black-box adversarial attacks, where the aim is to
generate adversarial examples for deep learning models solely based on information
limited to output labels (hard label) to a queried data input. We use Bayesian
optimization (BO) to specifically cater to scenarios involving low query budgets
to develop efficient adversarial attacks. Issues with BO’s performance in high
dimensions are avoided by searching for adversarial examples in structured low-
dimensional subspace. Our proposed approach achieves better performance to
state of the art black-box adversarial attacks that require orders of magnitude more
queries than ours.
1 Introduction
Neural networks are now well-known to be vulnerable to adversarial examples: additive perturbations
that, when applied to the input, change the network’s output classification [13]. Work investigating
this lack of robustness to adversarial examples often takes the form of a back-and-forth between newly
proposed adversarial attacks, methods for quickly and efficiently crafting adversarial examples, and
corresponding defenses that modify the classifier at either training or test time to improve robustness.
The most successful adversarial attacks use gradient-based optimization methods [13, 22], which
require complete knowledge of the architecture and parameters of the target network; this assumption
is referred to as the white-box attack setting. Conversely, the more realistic black-box setting requires
an attacker to find an adversarial perturbation without such knowledge: information about the network
can be obtained only through querying the target network, i.e., supplying an input to the network
and receiving the corresponding output. In terms of information obtained from queries, it can be
further categorized into soft-label and hard-label. As far as soft-label information is concerned, the
information for a query is typically in terms of the logit values or the evaluation of the loss function
at that particular input. The more realistic and challenging of the two, i.e., hard-label information
obtained from a query is just the label of the input fed into the network.
In real-world scenarios, it is extremely improbable for an attacker to have unlimited bandwidth to
query a target classifier. In evaluation of black box attacks, this constraint is usually formalized via
the introduction of a query budget: a maximum number of queries allowed to query the model per
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input, after which an attack is considered to be unsuccessful. Several recent papers have proposed
attacks specifically to operate in this query-limited context [19, 18, 6, 31, 4, 23, 7, 8]; nevertheless,
these papers typically consider query budgets in the order of 10,000 or 100,000. This leaves open
questions as to whether black-box attacks can successfully attack a deep learning based classifier in
severely query limited settings, e.g., with query budgets below 1000. Furthermore, restricting the
information available from querying to be hard-label only, makes the aforementioned direction even
more challenging. In such a query limited regime, it is natural for an attacker to use the entire query
budget, so we ask the pertinent question: In a constrained query limited setting, can one design query
efficient yet successful black box adversarial attacks, where the queried information is restricted to
being hard-label?
This work proposes a hard-label black-box attack method grounded in Bayesian optimization [20,
12], which has emerged as a state of the art black-box optimization technique in settings where
minimizing the number of queries is of paramount importance. Straightforward application of
Bayesian optimization to the problem of finding adversarial examples is not feasible: the input
dimension of even a small neural network-based image classifier is orders of magnitude larger
than the standard use case for Bayesian optimization. Rather, we show that we can bridge this
gap by performing Bayesian optimization in a reduced-dimension setting by considering structured
subspaces and mapping it back to full input space to obtain our final perturbation. We explore several
mapping techniques and find that reducing the search space to a structured subspace composed
of Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) basis vectors and a simple nearest-neighbor upsampling method
allows us to sufficiently reduce the optimization problem dimension such that Bayesian optimization
can find adversarial perturbations with more success than existing hard-label black-box attacks in
query-constrained settings.
We compare the efficacy of our adversarial attack with a set of experiments attacking three of the
most commonly used pretrained ImageNet [11] classifiers: ResNet50 [17], Inception-v3 [30], and
VGG16-bn [27]. We perform both `∞ and `2 norm constrained black-box attacks. Results from
these experiments show that with small query budgets upto 1000, the proposed method Bayes-Attack
achieves significantly better attack success rates than those of existing methods, and does so with far
smaller average query counts.
Furthermore, ablation experiments are performed so as to compare the effectiveness of the config-
urations considered in our attack setup, i.e., selection of the structured low dimensional subspace
and mapping techniques to generate adversarial perturbations in original image space. Given these
results we argue that, despite being a simple approach (indeed, largely because it is such a simple and
standard approach for black-box optimization), Bayesian Optimization should be a standard baseline
for any hard-label black-box adversarial attack task in the future, especially in the small query budget
regime.
2 Related Work
Within the black-box setting, adversarial attacks can be further categorized by the exact nature of the
information received from a query. This work exists in the restrictive hard-label or decision-based
setting, where queries to the network yield only the predicted class of the input, with no other
information about the network’s final layer output. The most successful work in this area is OPT
attack [7], which reformulates the problem as a search for the direction of the nearest decision
boundary and employs a random gradient-free method, and Sign-OPT attack [8], which refines this
approach by replacing binary searches with optimization via sign SGD. In Boundary Attack [1],
attacks are generated via random walks along the decision boundary with rejection sampling. Several
other attacks have extended this work and refined its query efficiency: HopSkipJumpAttack [5]
does so with improved gradient estimation, while Guessing Smart [2] incorporates low-frequency
perturbations, region masking, and gradients from a surrogate model. In both cases, significant issues
remain: the former still requires queries numbering above 10,000 to produce adversarial examples
with small perturbations, and the latter relies on resources required to train a surrogate model.
Most work in black-box adversarial attacks has been dedicated to score-based or soft label attacks,
where queries return the entire output layer of the network, either as logits or probabilities. Relative
to hard-label attacks, queries in the soft label setting receive a large amount of information from each
query, making them amenable to approaches from a wide variety of optimization fields and techniques.
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The most popular avenue is maximizing the network loss with zeroth-order methods via derivative-
free gradient estimation, such as those proposed in Ilyas et al. [19], which uses time-dependent and
data-dependent priors to improve the estimate, as well as Ilyas et al. [18], which estimates gradients
using natural evolution strategies (NES). Other methods search for the best perturbation outside of
this paradigm; Moon et al. [23] casts the problem of finding an adversarial perturbation as a discrete
optimization problem and uses local search methods to solve. These works all search for adversarial
perturbations within a search space with a hard constraint on perturbation size; others [6, 31, 16]
incorporate a soft version of this constraint and perform coordinate descent or random walks to
decrease the perturbation size while ensuring the perturbed image is misclassified.
A separate class of transfer-based attacks train a second, fully-observable substitute network, attack
this network with white-box methods, and transfer these attacks to the original target network. These
may fall into one of the preceding categories or exist outside of the distinction: in Papernot et al. [24],
the substitute model is built with score-based queries to the target network, whereas Liu et al. [21]
trains an ensemble of models without directly querying the target network at all. These methods
come with their own drawbacks: they require training a substitute model, which may be costly or
time-consuming; attack success is frequently dependent on similarity between substitute and target
networks; and overall attack success tends to be lower than that of gradient-based methods.
Beyond these categories, we note that our method here sits among several recent works that find
improved success rates and query efficiency from restricting their search for adversarial perturba-
tions to particular low-dimensional subspaces. One common approach is to generate adversarial
perturbations from low-frequency noise, such as in Guo et al. [15], which improves existing attacks
[18, 1] by confining searches to subspaces of low frequency basis vectors in the Discrete Cosine
Transform (DCT) basis, and in Brunner et al. [2], which employs a Perlin noise basis. In a similar
vein, Ilyas et al. [19] exhibits that local spatial similarity of images, i.e., the tendency of nearby
pixels to be similar, extends to gradients, and uses this observation to motivate focusing on tile-based
perturbations.
Finally, there has been some recent interest in leveraging Bayesian optimization (BO) for constructing
adversarial perturbations. For example, Zhao et al. [32] uses BO to solve the δ-step of an alternating
direction of method multipliers approach, Co et al. [10] searches within a set of procedural noise
perturbations using BO and Gopakumar et al. [14] uses BO to find maximal distortion error by
optimizing perturbations defined using 3 parameters. On the other hand, prior work in which
Bayesian optimization plays a central role, the use cases and experiments are performed only in
relatively low-dimensional settings, highlighting the main challenge of its application: Suya et al. [29]
examines an attack on a spam email classifier with 57 input features, and in Co [9] image classifiers
are attacked but notably the attack does not scale beyond MNIST classifiers. In contrast to these past
works, the main contribution of this paper is to show that Bayesian Optimization presents as a scalable,
query-efficient alternative for large-scale hard-label black-box adversarial attacks when combined
with searching in structured low dimensional subspaces and employing mapping techniques to get
the final adversarial perturbation. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper considering
hard label black-box attacks with query budgets under 1000.
3 Problem Formulation
The following notation and definitions will be used throughout the remainder of the paper. Let F be
the target neural network. We assume that F : Rd′ → {1, . . .K} is a K-class image classifier that
takes normalized RGB inputs: x ∈ Rd′ where each channel of each pixel is bounded between 0 and
1, y ∈ {1, . . . ,K} denotes the original label, and the corresponding output F (x) is the final output
label or class.
Rigorous evaluation of an adversarial attack requires careful definition of a threat model: a set of
formal assumptions about the goals, knowledge, and capabilities of an attacker [3]. We assume that,
given a correctly classified input image x, the goal of the attacker is to find a perturbation δ such
that x + δ is misclassified, i.e., F (x + δ) 6= F (x). We operate in the hard-label black-box setting,
where we have no knowledge of the internal workings of the network, and a query to the network
F yields only the final output class (top-1 prediction).To enforce the notion that the adversarial
perturbation should be small, we take the common approach of requiring that ‖δ‖p be smaller than a
given threshold  in some `p norm.In this work, we specifically focus on `2 and `∞ norm. Finally, we
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let t denote the query budget, i.e., if an adversarial example is not found after t queries to the target
network, the attack is considered to be unsuccessful.
In line with most adversarial attack setups, we pose the attack as a constrained optimization problem,
defined below:
max
δ
f(x, y, δ) (1)
subject to ‖δ‖p ≤  and (x + δ) ∈ [0, 1]d′ ,
where f(x, y, δ) =
{
0 if F (x + δ) 6= y
−1 if F (x + δ) = y
Crucially, the input x + δ to f is an adversarial example for F if and only if f(x, y, δ) = 0.
Though our objective function is straightforward, we empirically show that it leads to significant
performance improvements over the current state of the art for hard-label black-box attacks for both
`∞ and `2 threat models.
We briefly note that the above threat model and objective function were chosen for simplicity and
for ease of directly comparing with other black box attacks, but the attack method we propose is
compatible with many other threat models. For example, we may change the goals of the attacker or
measure δ in `1 norm instead of `2 and `∞ norms with appropriate modifications to the objective
function and constraints in equation 1.
4 Proposed Attack Method
In this section, we present the proposed method for solving the optimization problem in equation 1.We
begin with a brief description of Bayesian optimization [20] followed by its application to generating
black-box adversarial examples. Finally, we describe our method for attacking a classifier with high
input dimension (e.g. ImageNet) in a query-efficient manner.
4.1 Bayesian Optimization
Bayesian Optimization (BO) is a method for black box optimization particularly suited to problems
with low dimension and expensive queries. Bayesian Optimization consists of two main components:
a Bayesian statistical model and an acquisition function. The Bayesian statistical model, also referred
to as the surrogate model, is used for approximating the objective function: it provides a Bayesian
posterior probability distribution that describes potential values for the objective function at any
candidate point. This posterior distribution is updated each time we query the objective function at a
new point. The most common surrogate model for Bayesian optimization are Gaussian processes
(GPs) [25], which define a prior over functions that are cheap to evaluate and are updated as and
when new information from queries becomes available. We model the objective function h using a
GP with prior distribution N (µ0,Σ0) with constant mean function µ0 and Matern kernel [26, 28] as
the covariance function Σ0, which is defined as:
Σ0(x,x
′) = θ20 exp(−
√
5r)
(
1 +
√
5r +
5
3
r2
)
, r2 =
d′∑
i=1
(xi − x′i)2
θ2i
where d′ is the dimension of input and {θi}d′i=0 and µ0 are hyperparameters. We select hyperparame-
ters that maximize the posterior of the observations under a prior [26, 12].
The second component, the acquisition function A, assigns a value to each point that represents
the utility of querying the model at this point given the surrogate model. We sample the objective
function h at xn = arg maxxA(x|D1:n−1) where D1:n−1 comprises of n− 1 samples drawn from
h so far. Although this itself may be a hard (non-convex) optimization problem to solve, in practice
we use a standard approach and approximately optimize this objective using the LBFGS algorithm.
There are several popular choices of acquisition function; we use expected improvement (EI) [20],
which is defined by EIn(x) = En [max (h(x)− h∗n, 0)] , where En[·] = E[·|D1:n−1] denotes the
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expectation taken over the posterior distribution given evaluations of h at x1, · · · ,xn−1, and h∗n is
the best value observed so far.
Bayesian optimization framework as shown in Algorithm 2 runs these two steps iteratively for
the given budget of function evaluations. It updates the posterior probability distribution on the
objective function using all the available data. Then, it finds the next sampling point by optimizing
the acquisition function over the current posterior distribution of GP. The objective function h is
evaluated at this chosen point and the whole process repeats.
In theory, we may apply Bayesian optimization directly to the optimization problem in equation 1 to
obtain an adversarial example, stopping once we find a point where the objective function reaches
0. In practice, Bayesian optimization’s speed and overall performance fall dramatically as the input
dimension of the problem increases. This makes running Bayesian optimization over high dimensional
inputs such as ImageNet (input dimension 3 × 299 × 299 = 268203) practically infeasible; we
therefore require a method for reducing the dimension of this optimization problem.
4.2 Bayes-Attack: Generating Adversarial Examples using Bayesian Optimization
Black-box attack methods tend to require a lot of queries because of the search space being high
dimensional. The query complexity of these attack methods depends on the adversarial subspace
dimension compared to the original image space. These methods can be improved by finding a
structured low dimensional subspace so as to make the black-box optimization problem feasible and
thereby resulting in adversarial examples with fewer queries and high success rates. In this section,
we define two low dimension subspaces favorable for generating `2 and `∞ norm constrained hard
label black-box attacks.
4.2.1 Low Dimensional Subspace for `2 norm constrained attack
To generate `2 norm constrained adversarial examples, our attack method utilizes low frequency fast
Fourier transform (FFT) basis vectors. FFT is a linear transform which, when applied to a natural
image, results in a representation in frequency space by sine and cosine basis vectors. For a given
image x ∈ Rd×d, the output of the FFT transform X := FFT(x) is defined by
X[u, v] =
1
d
d−1∑
i=0
d−1∑
j=0
x[i, j] exp
[
−j 2pi
d
(u · i+ v · j)
]
(2)
where 1d is the normalization constant to obtain isometric transformation, i.e., ‖x‖2 = ‖FFT(x)‖2.
The inverse fast fourier transform x = IFFT(X) is defined by:
x[i, j] =
1
d
d−1∑
u=0
d−1∑
v=0
X[u, v] exp
[
j
2pi
d
(u · i+ v · j)
]
(3)
The isometric property holds in reverse direction too, i.e. ‖X‖2 = ‖IFFT(X)‖2. For multi-channel
(colored) images, both FFT and IFFT can be applied channel wise independently. The low frequency
cosine and sine basis vectors are represented by small u, v values in real and complex components of
X(u, v) respectively. To restrict to low-frequencies, we allow only elements in the top-left brdc×brdc
square of X to have nonzero entries, where r ∈ (0, 1] is a parameter that controls how large we allow
our search space to be; that is, we enforce X(u, v) = 0 if u > brdc or v > brdc. The adversarial
perturbation is then obtained by computing IFFT(X).
To further reduce the dimension of this search space, we may also omit all sine or all cosine FFT
basis vectors by respectively constraining the real or imaginary parts of X to be zero. An ablation
study exploring the effect of removing sine or cosine FFT basis vectors on performance is shown in
supplementary material.
4.2.2 Low Resolution Subspace for `∞ norm constrained attack
Our method uses a data dependent prior [19] to reduce the search dimension of the perturbation for
generating `∞ norm constrained adversarial examples. We empirically show that we can utilize the
property of spatial local similarity in images to generate adversarial perturbations. For a given image
x ∈ Rd×d, we search for perturbations in a lower resolution image space X ∈ Rbrdc×brdc where
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Algorithm 1 Objective Function
1: procedure OBJ-FUNC(x0, y0, δ)
2: //  is the given perturbation
3: δ ← ΠpB(0,)(δ) . Projecting perturbation on `p-ball
4: δ′ ← map(δ) . Mapping perturbation from low dimension subspace to full input space
5: v ← f(x0, y0, δ′) . Quering the model
6: return v
Algorithm 2 Black-box Adversarial Attack using Bayesian Optimization
1: procedure BAYES-ATTACK(x0, y0)
2: D = {(δ1, v1), · · · , (δn0 , vn0)} . Quering randomly chosen n0 points.
3: Update the GP on D . Updating posterior distribution using available points
4: t← n0 . Updating number of queries till now
5: while t ≤ T do
6: δt ← arg maxδ A(δ | D) . Optimizing the acquisition function over the GP
7: vt ← OBJ-FUNC(x0, y0, δ) . Querying the model
8: t← t+ 1
9: if vt < 0 then
10: D ← D ∪ (δt, vt) and update the GP . Updating posterior distribution
11: else
12: return δt . Adversarial attack successful
13: return δt . Adversarial attack unsuccessful
r ∈ (0, 1] and use nearest neighbor interpolation (NNI) x′ = NNI(X) to obtain the final adversarial
perturbation. We note that x′ 6= x. The NNI transformation leads to equivalent `∞ norms, i.e.,
‖X‖∞ = ‖NNI(X)‖∞. For multi-channel images, NNI can be applied channel-wise independently.
4.2.3 Searching in Low Dimension Subspace
We use Bayesian optimization to search for the perturbation in low dimension subspace (brdc×brdc)
where r ∈ (0, 1] and then use the relevant mapping (IFFT for `2 or and NNI for `∞) to obtain the
adversarial perturbation in the original image space. This helps in reducing the query complexity
for our attack framework, due to the reduction of the search space to a structured low dimensional
subspace.
We define the objective function for running the Bayesian optimization in low dimension in Algorithm
1. We let ΠpB(0,) be the projection onto the `p ball of radius  centered at origin. Our method maps
the learned perturbation in low dimension subspace back to original input space to obtain the
adversarial perturbation. We maintain the `p norm constraint by projecting the low dimension
subspace perturbation on a `p ball of radius . Since, our mapping techniques (IFFT for `2 and
NNI for `∞) do not change their respective norms, the final adversarial perturbation obtained after
mapping to original input space also follows the `p constraint.
We describe the complete algorithm in Algorithm 2 where x0 ∈ Rd×d and y0 ∈ {1, . . . ,K} denote
the original input image1 and label respectively. The goal is to learn an adversarial perturbation
δ ∈ Rbrdc×brdc in much lower dimension, i.e., r << 1. We begin with a small dataset D =
{(δ1, v1), · · · , (δn0 , vn0)} where each δn is a brdc × brdc perturbation sampled from a given
distribution and vn is the function evaluation at δn i.e vn = OBJ-FUNC(x0, y0, δn). We iteratively
update the posterior distribution of the GP using all available data and query new perturbations
obtained by maximizing the acquisition function over the current posterior distribution of GP until we
find an adversarial perturbation or run out of query budget. The Bayesian optimization iterations run
in low dimension subspace brdc×brdc but for querying the model we project and map to the original
image space and then add the perturbation to the original image as shown in Algorithm 1 to get the
perturbed image to conform to the input space of the model. To generate a successful adversarial
perturbation, it is necessary and sufficient to have vt ≥ 0, as described in Section 3. We call our
1For simplicity, we assume a 2D image here, our method can be easily applied to multi-channel images.
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Table 1: Results for `2 untargeted attacks on ImageNet classifiers with a query budget of 1000
eps = 5.0 eps = 10.0 eps = 20.0
Classifier Method success avg. query success avg. query success avg. query
ResNet50
Boundary Attack 8.52 655.49 15.39 577.93 26.97 538.13
OPT attack 7.64 777.42 15.84 737.15 32.53 757.9
HSJA 6.99 904.27 14.76 887.17 28.37 876.78
Sign-OPT 7.64 777.42 15.84 737.15 32.53 757.9
Sign-OPT-FFT 13.99 919.14 29.26 906.3 55.97 902.82
Bayes attack 20.1 64.23 37.15 64.13 66.67 54.97
Inception-v3
Boundary Attack 0.38 998.67 6.88 588.24 14.52 531.06
OPT attack 3 820.79 6.88 673.71 16.27 722.75
HSJA 1.63 878.54 5.51 882.48 12.89 887.8
Sign-OPT 7.13 839.57 14.26 831.76 22.78 837.91
Sign-OPT-FFT 7.13 929.32 15.39 924.64 34.79 917.27
Bayes attack 11.39 109.65 22.65 65.66 39.92 68.86
VGG16-bn
Boundary Attack 11.23 626.33 21.27 547.64 39.37 503.22
OPT attack 11.09 736.58 21.79 658.9 43.86 718.68
HSJA 10.3 893.2 21.53 898.15 40.82 892.56
Sign-OPT 19.81 841.05 35.8 843.68 60.63 857.71
Sign-OPT-FFT 21.4 916.81 42.93 910.89 70.81 907.93
Bayes attack 24.04 69.84 43.46 76.54 71.99 48.95
attack successful with t queries to the model if the Bayesian optimization loop exits after t iterations
(line 12 in Algorithm 2), otherwise it is unsuccessful. Finally, we note that the final adversarial image
can be obtained by mapping the learned perturbation back to the original image space and adding to
the original image as shown in supplementary material. For multi-channel image, the low dimension
subspace is of form 3× brdc × brdc and the whole algorithm works the same way. The initial choice
of the dataset D to form a prior can be done using standard normal distribution, uniform distribution
or even in a deterministic manner (e.g. with Sobol sequences). In this work, we focus on `∞ and `2-
norm perturbations, where the respective projections for a given perturbation bound  are defined by
Π∞B(x0,)(x) = min {max{x0 − ,x},x0 + } , and Π2B(x0,)(x) = arg min‖y−x0‖2≤ ‖y − x‖2.
Finally, we note that even though our simple objective leads to same objective values at queried
points in the initial search phase, the Gaussian process provides an expression for the uncertainty
at each point in the feasible space, and updates this uncertainty as each new data point is queried.
This information is taken into account in the acquisition function, so that, for instance, Bayesian
optimization will not query a point that is close to points that have already been queried.
5 Experiments
Our experiments focus on the untargeted attack setting where, given an image correctly classified by
the model, the goal is to produce an `p-constrained perturbation such that applying this perturbation
to the original image causes misclassification. We evaluate both `∞ and `2 norm constrained hard
label black-box attacks. To compare performance, we randomly selected a subset of 1000 images,
normalized to [0, 1], from the ImageNet validation set. In all experiments in this section, attacks
are performed on this fixed set of images. We primarily compare performance of Bayes-Attack on
ImageNet classifiers with that of other hard-label black-box attacks for small query budgets, and
report success rates and average queries. We also perform ablation studies on the ImageNet validation
set by exploring different low dimension structured subspaces and examining different upsampling
techniques.
We define success rate as the ratio of the number of images successfully perturbed for a given query
budget to the total number of input images. In all experiments, images that are already misclassified
by the target network are excluded from the set; only images that are initially classified with the
correct label are attacked. For each method of attack and each target network, we compute the success
rate and average number of queries used to attack among images that were successfully perturbed.
Implementation details can be found in supplementary material.
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5.1 Untargeted `2 attack
We compare the performance of the proposed method Bayes-Attack against Boundary attack[1],
OPT attack[7], HopSkipJump attack (HSJA) [5] and Sign-OPT[8], which is the current state of the
art among hard-label black-box attacks within the `2 threat model. We also compare our model
to another version of Sign-OPT where we search the perturbation in a low dimensional subspace
defined by FFT basis similar to the proposed method (Sign-OPT-FFT). On ImageNet, we attack the
pretrained2 models − ResNet50 [17], Inception-v3 [30] and VGG16-bn [27].
We compare the performance across three different `2 perturbation bounds, where we set  to 5.0,
10.0 and 20.0 respectively. We evaluate the performance of all the methods with a budget of up to
1000 queries. For the baseline methods, we use the implementations made available by the authors
and use hyperparameters as suggested in their respective papers.
Table 1 compares success rate and average query count of all methods, models, and  thresholds
for a query budget of 1000. We can see that Bayes-Attack consistently outperforms the other
baseline methods across all classifiers and epsilons. As we can see from the table that searching for
perturbation in low dimension Sign-OPT-FFT clearly improves over Sign-OPT but our proposed
method Bayes-Attack achieves better success rates and hugely reduces the average query count
by up to a factor of 10 consistently over all the baseline methods. This huge reduction in query
counts for finding adversarial perturbations can be contributed to efficiently searching for adversarial
perturbations using Bayesian optimization.
5.2 Untargeted `∞ attack
We also perform untargeted `∞ attacks with our model. We compare the performance of the proposed
method Bayes-Attack against OPT [7] and Sign-OPT [8], which is the current state of the art among
hard-label black-box attacks within the `∞ threat model. We use the same query budgets, models,
and reported metrics as in the previous subsection. Here, we set the `∞ perturbation bound  to
0.05. Table 2 compares the performance of `∞ norm constrained attacks in terms of success rate
and average query count. The proposed method Bayes-Attack consistently achieves significant
performance improvements over the current methods.
Table 2: Results for `∞ untargeted attacks on ImageNet classifiers with a query budget of 1000
ResNet50 Inception-v3 VGG16-bn
Method success avg. query success avg. query success avg. query
OPT attack 5.73 246.31 2.87 332.17 7.53 251.21
Sign-OPT 10.31 660.37 7.51 706.3 15.85 666.87
Bayes attack 67.48 45.94 44.29 72.31 78.47 33.7
We perform ablation experiments described in supplementary material to compare the effectiveness
of the configurations considered in our attack setup, i.e., selection of the structured low dimensional
subspace and mapping techniques to generate adversarial perturbations in the original image space.
We observe that the low frequency FFT basis vectors perform significantly better compared to random
set of vectors generated from standard normal distribution in searching for adversarial perturbations.
6 Conclusions
We consider the problem of hard label black-box adversarial attacks in low query budget regimes
which is an important practical consideration. To efficiently generate adversarial attacks with higher
success rates and fewer queries, we define two low dimension structured subspace favorable for
`2 and `∞ norm constrained hard-label black box attacks. Our proposed method uses Bayesian
optimization for finding adversarial perturbations in the low dimension subspace and maps it back
to original input space to obtain final perturbation. We successfully demonstrate the efficacy of our
method in attacking multiple deep learning architectures for high dimensional inputs in both `∞ and
2Pretrained models available at https://pytorch.org/docs/stable/torchvision/models
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`2 threat models. Our work opens avenues regarding applying BO for black-box adversarial attacks
in high dimensional settings with low query budgets.
7 Broader Impacts
Adversarial examples present one of the largest obstacles to deploying ML in real-world, safety-
critical domains. And while these issues have been known for some time, it still seems to be a
common assumption that adversarial examples are “toy” demonstrations that capture an edge case
rather than presenting a genuine challenge for ML systems. The more we can demonstrate the
feasibility of adversarial attacks in as realistic scenarios as possible, the more we hope to raise
awareness of the (lack of) robustness of modern deep learning methods, and encourage others to
consider these possibility before deploying ML systems in open-world environments. Hard label
attacks address yet another gap that typically exists in the creation of adversarial examples (which
more often are developed in the white-box setting, or a black-box setting that still receives access to
the exact loss function, both of which are not realistic in most real-world deployments).
Of course, such attacks could also be more directly used by malicious actors to actually break real
world systems. It is true that the current limitations of the approach (i.e., the fact that it requires
evaluating the classifier on multiple perturbed instances of the same input, and the ability to directly
manipulate the input digitally) would also thus apply to these attempts as well. But adversarial attacks
can already be used in domains such as breaking malware detection systems, and such domains seem
to be a reasonable fit for the methods we present here. Thus, while we ultimately feel that true security
of such systems is strengthened by an appreciation for their weaknesses (just as in the case with
traditional computer security), it is certainly true that the attacks can be used for malicious purposes
as well, and these potential negative uses should be considered in the development of adversarial
attacks.
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A Appendix
A.1 Illustration of the proposed black box attack
Upsampling x 0.1 +
Adversarial perturbation Original Image
Label: white wolf
Final adversarial image
Label: shower curtain
Low-dimension perturbation
Figure 1: An illustration of a black-box adversarial attack performed by the proposed method
BAYES-ATTACK on RESNET50 trained on ImageNet. Images from the left: first figure shows the
learnt perturbation in low dimension d′ = 972(3× 18× 18); second figure is the final adversarial
perturbation (3 × 224 × 224) obtained by using nearest neighbor upsampling; third figure is the
original image (note that the input size for RESNET50 is 3× 224× 224) which is initially classified
as white/arctic wolf; last image is the final adversarial image obtained by adding the adversarial
perturbation to the original image. RESNET50 classifies the final adversarial image as shower curtain
with high probability.
A.2 Implementation Details
We treat the size of low dimensional subspace used for running the Bayesian optimization loop as a
hyperparameter. For both `2 and `∞ attacks on ImageNet, we tune the the low dimensional subspace
size brdc × brdc over the range rd ∈ [5, 18]. For `2 attacks, we treat the option of representing the
subspace with sine and cosine FFT basis vectors separately or together as a hyper-parameter. We
initialize the GP with n0 = 5 samples drawn from a standard normal distribution in case of `∞ attacks,
and from the uniform distribution [−1, 1] for `2 attacks. For all the experiments in this section, we
use expected improvement as the acquisition function. We also examined other acquisition functions
(posterior mean, probability of improvement, upper confidence bound) and observed that our method
works equally well with other acquisition functions. We independently tune the hyperparameters on a
small validation set and exclude it from our final set of images to be attacked. We used BoTorch3
packages for implementation.
A.3 Additional Experiments
In this section, we perform ablation studies on ImageNet by exploring different low dimensional
structured subspaces and comparing mapping techniques for both `2 and `∞ threat models.
A.3.1 Low Dimension Subspaces
In case of the `2 threat model, we utilize the low dimensional subspace generated by the low frequency
sine and cosine FFT basis vectors. We can also separately consider the cosine FFT basis or sine
FFT basis separately by using only the real components or imaginary components of the frequency
domain representation.
We compare the attacks generated in the low dimension subspace created using cosine and sine FFT
basis vectors separately and together. For this experiment, we perform hard label black-box attacks
on ResNet50 trained on ImageNet with `2 perturbation set to 20.0. We maintain a query budget
3https://botorch.org/
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of 1000 across the experiments. For fair comparison, we keep the size of low dimension subspace
almost same across the experiments, i.e. 3× 18× 18 for cosine and sine FFT basis separately and
3× 12× 12× 2 when considering the complete FFT basis. We also compare with a random set of
vectors sampled from standard normal distribution. We keep the size of vectors sampled from normal
distribution same as 3× 18× 18.
Table 3: Performance comparison of FFT basis vectors and random vectors sampled from the standard
normal distribution for `2 attack with  = 20.0 on ResNet50.
Basis Success Avg Queries
Cosine FFT 64.38% 54.25
Sine FFT 63.74% 45.72
Cosine and sine FFT 66.67% 54.97
Standard Normal 33.33% 48.25
Table 3 compares the performance of basis vectors in terms of attack success rate and average query
count. We observe that the low frequency FFT basis vectors enhanced the attack accuracy significantly
as compared to random set of vectors generated from standard normal distribution. On the other hand
among low frequency components, sine and cosine FFT basis vectors together provide a slight gain in
attack success rate as compared to using them separately. Figure 2 shows the success rate at different
query budgets.
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Figure 2: Comparison of FFT basis vectors and random vectors sampled from the standard normal
distribution for `2 attack with  = 20.0 on ResNet50.
A.3.2 Mapping Techniques
Table 4: Comparing inverse fast Fourier transform (IFFT) and nearest neighbor interpolation (NNI)
for `2 and `∞ attack on ResNet50.
Attack Mapping Success Avg
Type Technique Rate Queries
`∞,  = 0.05
IFFT 59.16% 55.72
NNI 67.48% 45.94
`2,  = 20.0
IFFT 66.67% 54.97
NNI 59.54% 50.71
The proposed method requires a low dimensional subspace for efficiently searching the perturbation
and a mapping technique for transforming the perturbation learnt in the low dimension to the full
input space. We use FFT basis vectors for learning perturbation for `2 threat model while nearest
neighbor interpolation for `∞ threat model. Here, we compare both the methods on `2 as well as `∞
threat models.
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We compare both the mapping techniques on attacking ResNet50 trained on ImageNet with `∞ and
`2 perturbation set to 0.05 and 20.0, respectively. We maintain a query budget of 1000 across the
experiments. For fair comparison, we keep the size of low dimension subspace same across the
experiments, i.e. 3× 18× 18.
Table 4 shows the performance of both the mapping techniques on `∞ and `2 threat models. FFT
basis vectors perform better than nearest neighbor interpolation in the `2 threat model, while nearest
neighbor performs better for `∞ threat model.
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